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EVERY WEEK SINCE 1865

THE Nation

NOVEMBER 3, 1956
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Why the Dimes March On

The Polio Foundation's Dilemma

by Eric Josephson

Poland and U. S. Policy

New Openings for Diplomacy

by Joseph Starobin

Savings-Bank Insurance

"My Greatest Achievement": Brandeis

by Alpheus Thomas Mason

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LETTERS

Cort on Columnists

Dear Sirs: On the night of October 14 I watched the Ed Sullivan show on TV, staged here in Detroit to baptize the Ford Memorial Building. It was not so much a show as a parade of the Ford family and Ford executives, with Sullivan doing the honors. The next day I received your issue of October 13, containing David Cort's article on The Broadway Columnists. With it, Mr. Cort equals his earlier satiric success, The Time and Life of Henry Luce, printed in your February 18 issue.

Cort gladdens my heart when he takes phonies apart and sets them down for what they are. Cort may not have stopped the columnists from their inanities, but they will read what he has written and their egoes will be deflated for the long hereafter.

JIM CORBETT

Detroit, Mich.

Dear Sirs: Let's have more and more of David Cort. He is the most refreshing writer to grace *The Nation* pages in a long while. With his candor and incisiveness, he is about the closest thing to Henry Miller that you can find in a magazine today.

ROBERT SOMMER

Mandeville, La.

Dear Sirs: Heywood Broun was a very dear friend of mine. He stopped with us at our California house when he visited the West Coast in 1939, went with us to Santa Anita. Later, when we moved back to New York, Joe E. Brown's stature at UCLA enabled our daughter to enter that school, an intervention made necessary by the fact that as a New Yorker, she was an out-of-state applicant. Jim Moriarty was, by ancestry and mutual choice, one of my dearest friends. I've always boasted that Frank Sullivan, out of Saratoga, must be related to us as our family came from that town.

In *The Nation* article on Broadway columnists, I learn that Broun, Brown, Moriarty and Frank Sullivan loathed me. I learn, too, that Sullivan, "in his powerless days, often did his best to destroy the powerless and vulnerable performer"—which seems to me to be the neatest trick of any powerless week.

The article is so silly that it would nonsensical if it had not appeared in a magazine as important as *The Nation.*

ED SULLIVAN

New York City

Dear Sirs: David Cort's The Gossip Columnists was an interesting study of a fascinating subject, but I must object to his appraisal of gossipist Walter Winchell. I gladly admit that there may be much in Winchell that can be admired. But to give unlimited praise to this gossip columnist without even mentioning his consistently anti-civil liberties and anti-labor position appears to be a rather unforgiveable error of omission.

What difference actually is there between the McCarthy technique of smears and innuendoes and Walter Winchell's style of attacking people he does not approve of? No matter how much Walter Winchell may have "loved . . . the Great Cripple" (Mr. Cort might have used a more dignified phrase), in my own book Winchell is certainly no asset to the free press of this great democracy of ours.

WALTER GERSTEL

Berkeley, California

Dear Sirs: Re Mr. Gerstel's letter: As Franklin D. Roosevelt settles into his place in history it becomes no more offensive to describe him as "the great cripple" than to refer to the "blind Milton" or "the deaf Beethoven." In every case, the disability makes the man the greater.

As for Walter Winchell, he has status as an honorable reporter on show business, none as a political sage.

DAVID CORT

New York City

Issue Wrapped in Tissue

Dear Sirs: Have just this minute finished reading Dan Wakefield's article, Mr. Akers vs. Park Ave., in your October 13 issue. Cheers!

Consider the meaning: The fast talkers, the quick movers, the well-dressed, decisive Park and Fifth Ave. dwellers,—silent, uncomfortable at the sight of a live candidate. Are they embarrassed because Akers is unashamed to say he wants something, say it plainly in broad daylight—not whispered alone in the lonely silence where most Americans live today? What a gloom is in this tomb!

Nobody likes it. They react so apathetically because of a confusion so great that it seems hopeless: the two-party system! bipartisan policy! wrap the issue in the tissue! high, low, and middle roads! To where, what?

Alternatives have been slugged and tagged: Red, pinko, egg-head, do-gooder —a long list! Somebody likes it this way. But not the people, even those on Park Ave. Some day they'll start talking.

IRVING IGNATIN

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Big Difference

Dear Sirs: When the debate is on about the "lesser evil" and the arguments are given showing that there is no important difference between the Democratic and Republican parties (and very persuasive these arguments can be, too), one fact is not mentioned; and it is this fact, more than anything else, which has convinced me that there *is* a difference. That is: 90 per cent of the rich and powerful newspapers support the Republican candidates. What do these newspapers think they have to lose?

I believe all things in this world are connected, and that there is no effect without a cause.

MARTHA BAIRD

New York City

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The Nation, Nov. 3, 1956, Vol. 183, No. 18

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***Subscription Prices Domestic*—One year $7, Two years $12, Three years $17. Additional postage per year, Foreign and Canadian $1.**

Change of Address: Three weeks' notice is required for change of address, which cannot be made without the old address as well as the new.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs, Information Service, Dramatic Index.

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1956
VOLUME 183, NUMBER 18

THE Nation
EVERY WEEK SINCE 1865

Editorials

The Peacetime Uses of Adam Powell

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell has a penchant for setting off political chain reactions — some fission, some fusion — the latest being his dramatic endorsement of President Eisenhower. In the summer, Mr. Powell was in Europe when the Democrats assembled in Chicago — a circumstance which made it necessary for the delegates to adopt a civil-rights plank without benefit of his views. It is, of course, quite possible that it would have made little difference if he had foregone Europe for Chicago, but his decision to support the President might have carried more weight had he first tried to induce his own party to take a stronger civil-rights position.

Almost simultaneous with Mr. Powell's endorsement of the Republican nominees, the White House released a formal retraction by him of remarks on the subject of desegregation which he had mistakenly attributed to the President. Now it's the Republicans' turn to discover that while Mr. Powell has his uses — he is an immensely effective agitator of issues — there is always a danger of fall-out from his political bombshells.

Militant Youth: 1956 Style

The New York Times Youth Forum, a television panel show involving an adult guest and a group of high school students, offers us one of the rare clues to what the newest generation is like, or more appropriately, will be like. A recent forum dealing with major election issues revealed an interesting emphasis in the young people's attitudes. The participating students and their basic positions were:

— Susan Hoyt, a former Democratic supporter who switched to Ike because she thought it would be wrong to stop the H-bomb tests.

— Frederick Kafes, who backed the Democratic slate in the belief that Stevenson would see that the country got a stronger air force.

— John Mullarkey, an independent who felt the most important thing was that we not let down our guard by stopping H-bomb tests and production.

— John Crawford, an Ike supporter who felt the draft was necessary to help the United States maintain its place in the world.

— Elizabeth Jackson, a Stevenson supporter who thought the United States should stop the H-bomb tests as a moral example to the rest of the world.

Miss Jackson's concern with the moral issue was badly outnumbered; perhaps outmoded. The equation of "youth" with "idealism" is based on the history of past generations, and not on laws of nature. The meaning of "militant youth" in the fifties may turn out to be an antonym of what the same phrase meant in the thirties. Once there were student strikes against war. From the sound of the kids on the *Times* forum, the up-to-date image of militant youth is more likely to be a gang of high school seniors picketing Los Alamos for bigger and better blasts.

Button up your asbestos overcoat, Dad—tomorrow is already here.

Freedom for Export Only

In the immediate postwar days of 1945, James F. Byrnes, then Secretary of State, expressed great public concern lest elections scheduled for that year in Eastern Europe would be neither "democratic" nor "free." The concern sat oddly on a man who was once elected to Congress in the sovereign, segregated and poll-tax state of South Carolina with a grand total of 1,200 votes, which is probably the lowest number of votes gathered by any man successfully running for any national office in the history of this or any other republic.

It seems that the lack of democracy in Eastern Europe has a special and continuing fascination for our Southern statesmen. Following in Mr. Byrnes' footsteps is that great crusader for democracy, Mr. Eastland of Mississippi, who urges that the shackled people of Poland be given a "free election" in which to unshackle themselves. Unhappily, no Mississippi political leader can gracefully urge a free election for other people so long as his own people must pay for the privilege. Mississippi, like South Carolina, is a sovereign, segregated and poll-tax state. In 1954, it sent Mr. Eastland to the Senate with a grand total of 100,000 votes, which is somewhat better than Mr. Byrnes did, but

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still means that Mr. Eastland is called Senator by the expressed assent of not more than one of every twenty of his constituents, the other nineteen having been either of the wrong age or the wrong color to vote.

We go along with the NAACP, which in this instance wired Senator Eastland: "We are happy to join you in urging 'free elections' in Poland. And in turn we call upon you to join us in urging free elections in Mississippi. . . . You can use your influence as a U. S. Senator to open the polls to the half-million potential Negro voters who are now disfranchised in Mississippi by fraud, trickery and terror."

Socially Sanctioned Homicide

Over three thousand persons died from polio in 1952 but thanks to generous public support for some brilliant medical research this particular killer has finally been curbed (see p. 361). It is all the more shocking, therefore, to realize that a mass killer is still at large that, despite known remedies, operates with such methodical precision that the number of its victims can be predicted with statistical accuracy. It is only when some particularly frightful disaster occurs that the glare of publicity is focused on coal-mine casualties. But it is not the disasters that need spot-lighting (they command unlimited attention until the rescue team has reached the buried bodies); it is the daily toll of human life that should be headlined. For example, in the first eight months of 1956, casualties totaled 306 by comparison with 294 during the same period last year — a rate of about 1.13 per million man-hours. The public is so little aroused by these daily killings that they constitute a form of socially sanctioned homicide. Some such organization as the March of Dimes should keep these daily killings in the limelight until something is done to stop them.

Thoughts on Group-Think

The violence and volume of reactions to David Cort's article on the Broadway columnists, only a sample of which appears in this week's letters column, prompts an editorial comment. A new generation of magazine readers has now reached maturity. During most of their lifetime these readers have been exposed, along with the rest of us, to the anonymous group-think journalism of the news weeklies, not to mention the impersonal radio newscasters and the still more bland TV newscasters. Week after week these oracles suggest, with absolute assurance and a great show of expertness, that there is a predominantly fashionable point of view which all bright, wide-awake individuals should hold on every item in the week's news from international affairs through science and religion to sports and the arts.

The manner in which the personal pronoun has been eliminated from this flood of comment creates an impression that there is, in fact, a widely accepted, expert opinion on every subject touched on by the mass media, from Rock 'N Roll to female circumcision in Kenya. It is perilous for any individual, with a name, a face and an address, to question this prevailing view. An unsigned group-think comment, though it offends all the canons of common sense, will be accepted as though it were mere datum or statistic and not, as in fact it is, merely unlabeled opinion and often very wrong-headed opinion at that. Somehow we have become so thoroughly "other-directed," so sensitive to "what-other-people-will-think," that almost any expression of strong personal opinion on almost any subject is regarded askance as a manifestation of irresponsible eccentricity. Even magazine readers who complain of social conformity, complacency, and the insipid quality of our intellectual life, will recoil from a strong expression of individual opinion.

All the same, our experience indicates that there are also many readers who are becoming increasingly bored with the weekly "word" or "line" that is propagated by the mass media and are showing a new relish for stoutly held, clearly voiced personal opinion which is, after all, the most responsible form of journalism.

Foot-in-Mouth Disease

One of the most melancholy spectacles on the stage of public affairs is John Foster Dulles' running battle with his own inadequacy. Recently, after having once more put his foot in his mouth on the question of Suez, the Secretary of State announced that henceforth he was not to be held responsible for his press conference statements until he had had a chance to mull them over at leisure—a process which obviously would give him the benefit of other minds than his own.

The press conference is an ordeal for any democratic leader, and one can well believe that it puts an intolerable strain on Mr. Dulles. But the single purpose of such meetings is to ascertain the spokesman's opinions on matters of general interest. If he is allowed the privilege of retracting his words the process becomes a farce and reporters would do better to fall back on "informed sources" or a crystal ball.

Still, allowances must obviously be made for our chief of foreign affairs; he is simply not a very quick-witted man. In the very process of explaining the new policy of second-guessing to the press, Mr. Dulles did it again. He said that he might have to drop press conferences entirely if they were to be used to trap him into making blunders. The journalists present naturally bridled at the suggestion that they could, or would, lay snares for one of the world's most powerful statesmen. Later, when he was more at ease, Mr. Dulles said he also didn't believe that entrapment was just the word. It is funny—if one can afford this kind of humor.

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POLAND AND U. S. POLICY

New Openings for Diplomacy . . by JOSEPH STAROBIN

THE DRAMATIC evolution of Soviet-satellite relations is being viewed in the West, and understandably so, in terms of the disintegration of the Soviet Union's control over its Eastern bloc and the break-up of the power structure associated with the Stalinist era. That the transition took place relatively peacefully in Poland, but with bloodshed in Hungary, reflects special conditions in each country, but does not alter the fact that both are moving in the same direction.

Yet these developments may be only the outward form of an event of deeper significance, namely the emergence of a new Europe. If so there is need for a redefinition of both Soviet and American attitudes, and American foreign policy is presented with its greatest challenge and opportunity. For while Poland and Hungary take the headlines, NATO too, has been in a growing crisis. United States policy has been faced for some time with the problem of a new stance toward the alliance which was brought into being under its own auspices.

What is happening now is the dissolution of rival blocs. Out of this dissolution arises the possibility for a settlement of the world's most difficult and dangerous problem: Germany. In this new Europe, a reunified Germany would not be part of any bloc, since the blocs themselves would be disappearing. In such a context, the understandable fears of both the United States and Russia that a unified Germany would inevitably be part of one or another orbit, tipping the balance decisively against the other, would be relieved.

The events in Eastern Europe not only confront the United States with the problem of how it shall order its policies with respect to individual Communist-led countries (no longer grouped as a bloc), but toward the emerging new Europe as a whole. For the first time since the second World War, there exists the prospect of American economic participation in European development on premises quite different from those imposed by the cold war.

The implications of these changes for American-Soviet relations, for competitive coexistence on the premise of ending what is left of the cold war, are therefore of very great magnitude. The question is, first, whether Soviet policy will permit the evolution of forces set in motion by the downgrading of Stalin; second, whether the forces will be found in the United States who understand what is happening, and are prepared to take those measures—entirely in this country's interest—to facilitate these changes.

THE problem which has confronted the Communist leaders in every European country has been one of readjustment to a double reality: (1) the cold war had been very damaging to their economies and their political and social life, requiring drastic changes in order to advance; (2) the end of the cold war failed to result in a clearly-defined peace. Since the Geneva Conference of 1955, there has been a state of "no war, no peace" which has been intensely unsatisfactory. For it did not resolve the complex problem of what shall be done with a dangerously divided Germany.

The damage done by the cold war varies from country to country, but the Eastern European political leaders frankly admit their economies have been distorted and their hopes of material improvements for their working people dangerously shattered, as the Poznan events illuminated. The well-springs of their own inner life have been blocked by the weight of bureaucracy, the slavish fear of authority, the absence of the democratic forms that are needed to release initiative and spur progress. Italian and French Communists, while generally maintaining their strength, were unable to use it for purposes other than blocking European war; they were isolated and unable to take part in the solution of other urgent issues.

IT IS characteristic of Communists that whatever they feel they must do as a matter of empirical policy, of practical necessity, they must give an ideological justification. In Eastern Europe, this has taken the form of a search for "national paths" to socialism, redefining the relations of parties to the state, and inevitably of the Communist parties toward the Soviet Union. And it is ironical that this process should have taken such dramatic form in Poland. After the ouster of the Yugoslav Communists in the summer of 1948, the Polish Communists were hosts to delegations from many Communist parties, including the Soviet and the Western European, at an extraordinary congress of the Polish Workers Party in December, 1948. It was there that

Wladislaw Gomulka

JOSEPH STAROBIN is a former foreign editor of The Daily Worker *and the author of* Paris to Peking *and other books. In a letter to* The Nation *published in the issue of August 25, Mr. Starobin revealed that he had ceased "activity or membership" in the Communist Party three years ago.*

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these issues were argued out for the whole Communist movement. I happened to be present as a journalist. The chief speech was made by the late Boleslaw Bierut, who argued against the concepts of specific national paths to socialism which had had such wide currency in the immediate post-war years throughout Europe. He rejected these conceptions as Titoist. The peoples' democracies were redefined as forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat; any other conception was made to appear as a weakening of the bonds with the Soviet Union. Wladislaw Gomulka was formally replaced at that congress. Immediately following the Soviet Communist congress last February, where the concept of national paths to socialism was revived, Bierut died of a heart attack. And it is Gomulka who now returns to leadership.

Once it is decided that each country may take its own specific road to socialism (and Gomulka's first speech affirms a Polish way distinct from any other) then the Soviet experience acquires little more than a historical value. But practical consequences in relationship with the Soviet Union follow.

WHY THIS insistence on various roads to socialism and its corollary, a redefinition of the nature of the ties with the Soviet Union? Because the Communists outside the Soviet Union see them as the only way to solve their immediate problems: their economic crises, the lifting of the shadow of the German problem from Europe, and to make possible the evolution of Italy and France in a Socialist direction.

The drama of Khrushchev's last-minute visit to Warsaw—really an extension of the Soviet consultations with Tito at Brioni and at Yalta—lies in the fact that, having espoused a new view of Communist theory at their congress, the Russians showed themselves reluctant to accept its practical and logical conclusions. They have given the most striking example of a loss of leadership by seeking to reverse a course which they themselves had set in motion and legitimized. It was possible for the Communists of all countries to follow the Soviet lead into the most difficult passages of the cold war, even at very heavy cost to themselves. But it is not possible to follow the Soviet leaders *out* of the cold war if the Russians fail to follow the logic of their own leadership which involves, in fact, the abandonment of their concept of leadership.

Until now, the German problem has presented itself in terms of how unification was possible without tipping the scales of European power. Direct negotiations between the two Germanys have been blocked. Direct negotiation between East and West has yielded no results. No workable disarmament agreement has been reached whereby German rearmament could be checked and controlled.

The only way forward lay in the dissolution of the blocs as such—and history is forcing this solution. The process is developing reciprocally in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The dilemma of both the Soviet and the American leadership has been that neither one has so far been able to face the meaning of events. Mr. Dulles has to be dragged into accepting what he cannot prevent from happening, however he may try. Khrushchev, more conscious of the issues and having himself paved the way for this development by his trip to Belgrade in May, 1955, and by the twentieth congress, has not been able to lead, either. He finds the problem of leading by no longer leading exceedingly painful. Gomulka and Tito have had to do for Dulles and Khrushchev what neither could bring himself to do.

The experience which is still to unfold in Italy will be of the utmost importance. Side by side with reuniting the Socialist movement in Italy so that it can participate in deciding the country's destinies, the Italian Communists have been making significant changes in their doctrine; they not only affirm their own parliamentary roads toward socialism, but in their policy statement of Ocotber 14, in preparation for their December congress, they envisage the possibility of Italy remaining within the Atlantic Treaty Organization itself.

Thus, the road is opening for a democratic government in Italy based on the reunited Socialists and the Left of the Christian Democrats, supported by the Communists even if they cannot participate in it. This combination would give Italy the chance of experimenting with its own transition to socialism. Remaining in a NATO which will have lost its aggressive significance in the general dissolution of European blocs, such an Italy could not only tackle its urgent problems of development, but could do so with the real prospect of avoiding internal conflict and foreign intervention. Such an Italy, in "going Socialist," could not be joining a "Communist orbit" which no longer existed.

The most vital questions, of course, lie in what the repercussions of this rather convulsive "wrenching-free" mean for the Soviet Union itself, and why the process is proving itself so painful to its present leaders. Did they envisage some other course for their allies in both parts of Europe? Do they fear that an independent Poland would be an inadequate bulwark to their security? Or do they feel that the process at work in Eastern Europe confronts them with problems of "democratization" within the Soviet Union itself which they are not yet prepared to meet?

AS FOR United States policy, in what sense do events offer it a most serious challenge and a very great opportunity? It will be very revealing to see whether the Polish request for a $50,000,000 loan, made some time ago and recently rejected, will be reexamined in Washington. Significantly, it was a Polish Communist editor who took the initiative

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on October 11 to reappraise the Marshall Plan; the importance of his article does not lie so much in its retrospective view, but in its exploration of whether United States economic assistance is possible to a Socialist country "without strings attached."

The United States is likely to be needing such outlets for its machine goods as well as agricultural surpluses. The experience of the "cold war" showed that expanding markets could not be found in terms of "stopping communism." But they could become possible on the basis of competitive coexistence in a Europe where rival blocs have been dissolved. Here is a foundation for American economic relations, of very real importance to all parties concerned, if indeed United States policy can be brought to recognize the European realities.

As in most of the great dramas of history, the actors do not always understand the implications of the drama itself. Indeed, even the actors on the Communist side, who have prided themselves on being able to "make history" because they have understood it, have often acted in a fashion contradictory to their own needs and interests. Poland and Hungary have proven dramatic examples.

WHY THE DIMES MARCH ON

Polio Foundation's Dilemma . . by ERIC JOSEPHSON

USUALLY, when an organization that depends on voluntary contributions is almost finished with its job, it prepares to go out of business. The battle against polio is now in the mopping-up stage. Although search continues for a more effective vaccine, the Salk shots have proved successful; nearly forty million youngsters have been vaccinated at least once, and an end to polio epidemics is clearly in sight. But the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, which has been largely responsible for the victory against polio, shows no eagerness to retire from the scene of medical philanthropy. Its spokesmen combat public "complacence" about the disease; and its fund-raising arm, the March of Dimes, is preparing for another big winter campaign. During 1956, the organization raised over $50,000,000 and its goal for 1957 is $46,000,000. Where will it go from here?

Since 1938, when Franklin D. Roosevelt founded the polio foundation, one of the greatest of all advertising campaigns has sold Americans the fight against a dread but relatively rare disease. In that time hundreds of thousands of volunteers have worked for the March of Dimes and many millions of citizens have contributed approximately $400,000,000 to its cause. Last year, despite egregious blunders which marked the production and distribution of Salk vaccine, the long effort to find a safe and effective preventive for polio began to bear fruit. At the present time, there are still millions of children who have not been vaccinated at all, millions more who have yet to receive their second and third shots, and thousands of persons who, afflicted with polio in the past, need continued treatment and care. But enormous progress has been made, and while the foundation warns that "polio isn't licked yet," certainly it is no longer the menace that it once was.

The polio foundation has performed a major public service with missionary zeal. To it must go credit for stimulating and supporting most of the scientific research in this country on infantile paralysis, for developing vaccines and for the care and treatment of thousands of polio victims. Its president, Basil O'Connor—who was Roosevelt's law partner—has made the fight against polio his life work, and the organization may justifiably take pride in the part which it has played in controlling the disease.

However, the manner in which the foundation has conducted its fund-raising campaigns and what Walter Lippmann called "the dramatic build-up, theatrical suspense and spectacular publicity" which have accompanied many of its activities, must be viewed more critically. The extraordinary amount of attention given to the fight against polio has tended to exaggerate the relative importance of the disease. In 1952, which was the year of the most terrible epidemic on record, the total number of deaths caused by acute poliomyelitis was less than half the figure for homicides and only one-twelfth of the number of fatal automobile accidents. Over three thousand persons died from polio in 1952, but nearly a quarter of a million died from cancer and over half a million from diseases of the heart. The truth is that polio rarely strikes. For the past seven years, including the three worst polio epidemics, the average number of cases per year has been fewer than 38,000. Polio kills and it cripples, but only relatively few. Half of all cases recover completely and only about one out of seven is permanently disabled.

Even in the age group which is most heavily afflicted, polio is less common as a cause of death than accidents or cancer. In 1952, there were nearly 1,900 deaths from polio among youngsters under the age of twenty, but over 20,000 in this age group alone were killed in accidents and nearly 4,500 died from cancer. The statistics of infantile paralysis do not tell the whole story. The care and treatment of its victims are long and expensive—far beyond the

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means of many sufferers. But cancer, too, is an expensive disease.

It is important to appreciate the relative importance of infantile paralysis as a "killer" because in its fund-raising appeals, the polio foundation has given the distinct impression that the menace is one of gigantic proportions. This warlike propaganda has been highly effective, as measured by the millions of contributions to the March of Dimes, but it has also had unfortunate consequences: the widespread belief that polio is the Number One Child Killer, the hysterical and sometimes riotous demands of mothers that their children be vaccinated (before Salk vaccine became readily available), premature and exaggerated claims for the vaccine's effectiveness, and the great vaccine "mess" of 1955. The foundation has put its message across, but at the cost of scaring many parents out of their wits.

THE POLIO foundation's "hard sell" has had tangible results, but it has been a costly advertising campaign. Since 1938, the organization has spent $250,000,000 on the care and treatment of polio victims and a total of $25,000,000 for scientific research. But in two years, 1954 and 1955, it spent nearly $13,000,000 on fund-raising alone, which amounted to over half of what it had devoted to research in the *previous seventeen years*. Last year, the foundation spent over twice as much on fund-raising as on basic research. As Marguerite Shepard pointed out in a remarkable series of articles in the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat,* two diseases which cripple twenty-one million victims — mental illness and arthritis—are fought with less charity money than it takes to conduct the *fund-raising* campaign of the polio foundation, which combats a disease affecting some one hundred thousand people.

The introduction of Madison Avenue techniques to the field of health has made the infantile paralysis foundation the giant among medical philanthropies. Its fund-raising activities in the last few years have been more than twice as successful as those of either the American Cancer Society or the American Heart Association. As a result, the public has been induced to contribute more to the fight against polio than to the campaigns against cancer and heart disease, the two greatest killers of all.

High-pressure salesmanship—saturating the charity "market," repeating the message endlessly, making everybody polio-conscious—is not the only explanation of the foundation's phenomenal success. Roosevelt's courageous struggle against the ravages of polio dramatized the nature of the illness for the whole nation. The support which he gave to the foundation in its early years was of inestimable value and the charismatic appeal of his name as "founder" has been used shrewdly by its publicists ever since. Above all, the organization's message has proved irresistible because it has been able to arouse the natural concern of mothers and fathers for their children's health.

Another—indeed, a unique—factor in the success of the polio foundation is that the March of Dimes has consistently refused to join forces with any community or institutional fund-raising drives. It has even been known to turn down funds which were collected by joint appeals and *earmarked* for the fight against polio. In defense of its separate campaigns, the March of Dimes argues that "such collections do not preserve the identity of the appeal or tell the story of the programs to be supported by the contributions." Competition is strong among medical fund-raisers and the polio foundation has had no desire to submerge itself in collective appeals. As one spokesman for the March of Dimes put it, "other causes will come along and will have their opportunity before the bar of public opinion. And they will succeed or fail according to the wishes of the American people and the factual information given to them." But it is top-notch salesmanship, not the good of public opinion, which has given the polio fighters the edge over their competitors.

THE CLIMAX in the history of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis came in the summer of 1955, when the results of the Salk vaccine's field test were announced. The "Great Vaccine Mess" that followed is now a familiar story.

The polio foundation cannot be held responsible for all of the crises that developed—the failure of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to plan for the emergency; the accident at Cutter Laboratories; the shortage of vaccine, and the sensational treatment of the story by press and TV. But as Leonard Engel wrote at the time, there had been "a complete failure to educate the public properly on vaccines," although the foundation had been engaged in propaganda for nearly two decades. Through the efforts of the polio organization, Salk vaccine "received much more publicity than any medical discovery should," Engel added; and the result was a widespread belief that the vaccine was 100 per cent effective—despite warnings by the scientists responsible for its field trial. This belief led in turn to an almost insatiable demand for the vaccine.

TO A number of observers at the time, the foundation had been guilty of over-stimulating the public. The extraordinary amount of publicity which it arranged for the new vaccine aroused expectations that could not be fulfilled immediately. One of the main reasons was that the organization had failed to plan for large-scale production. The problem of vaccinating the nation's youth clearly called for government intervention. But the professional polio-fighters, committed to private enterprise in medicine, had never encouraged the government to play a leading part in the study and control of the disease.

In the end, government intervention became necessary, and it was only by monumental trial and error that the program of vaccination was resumed on an orderly basis. Recently, the vaccine mess of 1955 became a minor issue in the Presidential campaign, with Republicans claiming credit for the program of free vaccinations and Democrats charging the Eisenhower Administration with partial responsibility for the confusion that marked the program in its early stages.

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That the vaccine mess of 1955 was avoidable has been made clear enough by the experience of Canada. There, after careful planning, the federal government proceeded quietly and efficiently to arrange for the vaccination of Canadian children. But the absence of press-agentry was not the only distinguishing mark in the Canadian handling of the vaccination problem. Vaccine produced in Canada's government-owned laboratory cost the consumer *less than half* as much as that sold by privately-owned American drug firms. Yet the production costs of all vaccine used in the field trials in the United States had been paid for by the infantile paralysis foundation, which spent $8,000,000 for vaccine in 1954. The drug companies themselves invested $17,000,000 to develop production facilities, but this outlay was partly offset by contracts which they received from the foundation.

With production costs partly underwritten by philanthropy, and over $50,000,000 allocated by the government for the purchase of Salk vaccine, profits of manufacturers soared, making 1955 one of the best years for the drug industry. In the case of one firm involved in making vaccine, Parke-Davis, net profit after taxes rose from $10.5 million in 1954 to $14.3 million in 1955; Wyeth Laboratories' profit in this period increased from $16.2 million to $20.5 million; and Sharp & Dohme's net jumped from $12.6 million to $15.7 million. The dimes of contributors to the polio foundation, along with taxes paid by citizens, had helped to fatten the profits of private drug producers.

RECENTLY, Representative Chet Holifield, a member of a House Government Operations subcommittee which is studying the possibility of price-fixing in Salk vaccine, charged that the federal government had paid an excessive price for the medicine. He demanded that the government obtain a refund from manufacturers and pay less for the vaccine in the future. In his statement, which accused manufacturers of "collusive practices and price-fixing," Representative Holifield claimed that five companies had offered identical bids on separate occasions and that three of them had raised the price of vaccine during a two-week period early in 1955. Under the free-enterprise system in matters of health, Americans have practically licked polio, but they have had to pay a high price.

This cartoon illustrates the polio foundation's approach to its 1957 fund-raising drive.

Another factor in the relatively high cost of preventing polio has been the attitude of the medical profession. The American Medical Association has consistently opposed the idea of comprehensive and effective national planning for polio prevention. At its annual meeting last June, the A.M.A. demanded that the government halt its purchase of polio vaccine above amounts needed for distribution to the indigent. According to the A.M.A.'s resolution, the government's distribution of vaccine has been extended to include others beside the indigent, thus constituting "unnecessary government spending." The A.M.A. also charged that the administration of the program has been inequitable, has cast "disrepute" on private doctors, and has caused "consternation, concern, and confusion [among] the public." The medical society requested the government to return the general wholesale and retail purchase of vaccine to "normal commercial channels." Two months later, the government complied with this request, ending its state-by-state allocation of vaccine and permitting agencies and users to order directly from manufacturers.

From the very beginning, some representatives of the medical profession have balked at what they consider "socialistic" practices in the distribution of Salk vaccine. For example, in one New Jersey suburban community early this year, the six resident physicians refused to participate in giving free polio shots. More recently, in a middle-class housing project in Brooklyn, a plan to vaccinate 700 adult tenants with Salk vaccine for two dollars a shot, with which two doctors had volunteered to cooperate, was halted when the Kings County Medical Society charged the residents' association with "unethical practices." The president of the Brooklyn medical chapter said that the project's tenants could afford the usual fees for Salk shots (approximately $3 if given in a doctor's office, and $4 at home) and that the plan represented "unethical competition."

Over-zealousness on the part of the polio foundation, the reluctance of the government to plan for the emergency, the stubborn resistance of organized medicine to any sort of national planning, and profit-seeking by the drug industry—these have been the ingredients of the vaccine mess.

HOW will the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis occupy itself in time to come? Since the conclusion of the 1955 field trials, the organization has had no part in the distribution of Salk vaccine, but has concerned itself with further research, with the care of polio victims and with an elaborate program of professional education. In the immediate future there is still much work to be done: the search for an improved vaccine continues; 80,000 who have been afflicted with polio in the past require treatment and rehabilitation; millions of children who were given their first shot of Salk vaccine need second and third shots; and there are still millions of youngsters who have not been vac-

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cinated at all. As recently as August, Basil O'Connor estimated that only one-half of those under nineteen years of age had been vaccinated. In the absence of a comprehensive national system of polio prevention, the problem of vaccinating the indigent remains serious; and the foundation's medical director, Dr. Hart E. Van Riper, announced recently that it would spend $10,000,000 to buy shots for those who cannot afford them. Reporting that the incidence of polio among young adults has been rising in the past few years, the foundation is also planning a nation-wide campaign this fall to encourage everybody up to the age of thirty-five to get Salk shots.

As for the more distant future, foundation spokesmen are noncommittal. It was rumored that its very considerable resources and talents would be devoted to the field of mental health, but this report has been denied. In any case, it is highly doubtful whether the polio foundation intends to liquidate itself, even though the battle against infantile paralysis is almost won. At the present time there is still plenty of mopping-up to be done, and in the future, who knows what new fields the organization may try to conquer? After nearly twenty years, a successful staff of fund-raisers and medical promoters tends to perpetuate itself —like the apparatus of government. As one of its staff members said, the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis "is not going out of business."

There may be some better method of planning for the nation's health than leaving it to hucksters, but under the American Way none has been discovered. The lesson of the polio foundation, as Marguerite Shepard wrote, is that "either Americans are going to have to change their 'giving' habits—giving where the need is greatest, not just where the yelling is loudest, or the [other] national health agencies are going to have to change their 'getting' tactics." Meanwhile, why shouldn't the hucksters of polio be let loose on the far greater problem of mental health—or even the menace of war? How could they fail?

Brandeis: "My Greatest Achievement"

Savings-Bank Insurance . . by ALPHEUS T. MASON

THE WEEKEND of November 10-13, Brandeis University will bring to a close a year of observances commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Louis Dembitz Brandeis. Dignitaries representing various fields of interest, headed by the Chief Justice of the United States, will gather at Waltham, Massachusetts, to pay tribute to him.

Why should this be so? What did Brandeis accomplish that makes it worth while to pause and think of him and his work? He was, it is true, long in the public eye, first as a crusading lawyer, espousing causes in which he saw a conflict between public and private interests. In 1916 President Wilson, whose hundredth birthday anniversary is also being celebrated this year, appointed him a Justice of the Supreme Court. Soon thereafter the phrase "Holmes and Brandeis dissenting" was coined as a verbal symbol of the great progressive crusade in twentieth-century America. Some may recall Brandeis' indefatigable industry, his stubborn insistence that the granite masonry of constructive statesmanship must be fashioned from facts, figures and statistics. But no mere listing of achievements, however impressive, suffices to give the measure of the man. *How* he did the things with which his name is joined, and *why*, come closer than any catalogue of accomplishments to an explanation of the high esteem in which he is held today.

Courtesy: Picture Collection, N. Y. Public Library

Louis Dembitz Brandeis

Brandeis appeared on the national scene in an era marked by extremes in political thought and action. While many eminent lawyers devoted themselves mainly or even solely to advancing the interests of wealth, to building industrial empires, wild-eyed reformers, some of them Brandeis' friends, tried with equal zeal to destroy capitalist enterprise. Brandeis joined neither camp. Unlike the raucous muckrakers then flourishing, he was not content merely to expose and deplore. He attacked no practice or institution without suggesting some social or legal device to replace it with something better and more in keeping with the best in our tradition. A builder rather than a destroyer, his "sliding-scale" system for public-utility rates brought cheaper gas and sounder gas securities. For railway regulation,

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he vitalized Frederick L. Taylor's principles of scientific management. Long before "bigness" had become an American fetish, he exposed the delusion that greater efficiency must result from greater bigness. For the anarchistic garment industry, he formulated and applied the preferential union shop. In 1902, he exposed the economic and social wastes of unemployment. Half a century before its adoption in 1955, he advocated the annual wage for industrial workers as contributing to stabilized employment.

IN NO field, however, did Brandeis so clearly demonstrate his passion for social statesmanship, his confidence in democracy, his implicit faith in the free man in a free society as in his savings-bank life insurance plan. He himself called it his "greatest achievement."

Insurance has now achieved such widespread popular acceptance it is hard to believe that irregularities and scandal ever blighted its name. We tend to forget that Charles Evans Hughes, as counsel for New York State's Armstrong legislative committee of 1905, began a long and distinguished public career by laying bare waste, graft and blind mismanagement among high insurance company officials. Mr. Brandeis, as counsel for the New England Policy-Holders' Protective Committee, had been studying insurance for some months before Hughes' shocking disclosures. Brandeis had torn away the screen of mystery behind which insurance officers hid their business. The actual conduct of life insurance, he said, is one of extraordinary simplicity. To run it successfully requires neither genius nor unusual business judgment, but "honesty, accuracy, persistence and economy." Much to Brandeis' surprise, the Armstrong committee recommended no relief whatever for those who suffered the greatest insurance wrongs—wage earners and salaried workers able to pay only five to fifty cents a week. Proportionately they paid far too high prices for their insurance, and most of them could not keep up even this small payment. Scarcely one out of eight who insured ever realized any benefits.

Insurance men themselves admitted unconscionable waste in the conduct of wage earners' insurance, but explained it away as due to house-to-house canvassing and collection of premiums, agents' commissions, bookkeeping and overhead. Almost everybody accepted this explanation. A considerable number of interested persons still do. Even the Armstrong committee assumed that this intolerable situation had to be left without a remedy. Brandeis did not. Urgently needed, the future Supreme Court Justice said, was "an institution which will recognize that the best method of increasing demand for life insurance is not eloquent, persistent persuasion, but, as in the case of other necessities of life, to furnish a good article at a low price." To be satisfactory, however, the corrective device must be consistent with our established traditions of freedom and democracy.

BY 1907, the year Brandeis introduced his own remedy, practically all industrialized countries had made some sort of provision for workers' insurance. Germany was trying to meet the need by compulsory legislation, dividing the burden between employers, employees and the state. England was turning to old-age pensions supported by general taxation. Certain American business corporations had established their own pension systems. A few trade unions undertook to provide modest protection against the contingencies of sickness, unemployment and accident. Brandeis rejected all these schemes as either inadequate or as violative of American principles of freedom. Corporation pensions were rejected as shackling still further the workers' independence. Trade unions could not do the job because their machinery was then wholly unsuited to provide either insurance or annuities. To meet the insurance needs of wage earners there had to be accumulations of funds from year to year. These had to be securely and responsibly invested and protected by all the safeguards which experience could command and government supervision and legislation could enforce. The course of his search for a remedy is route-marked by peculiarities of both method and philosophy.

The plan Brandeis worked out for Massachusetts in 1905-07 provides a sort of home rule in insurance by means of savings banks. His initial step was to master the facts. Besides study of dust-ridden records and reports, this required the help of insurance experts. Night after night he lugged home to Dedham suitcases filled with the reports of commissioners of insurance and of the Commissioner of Banks. He brought these back to the office the next day and drove ahead in his search. Months of such intensive work sped by before he could confidently announce: "We have found the answer. The Savings Banks can be adapted to the writing of insurance."

AFTER proving to himself and to others that the plan was demonstrably sound, he did not merely proclaim it and turn (as would the conventional reformer) to something else. He stuck to it, saw the scheme through to adoption. The approval of experts and of leading citizens, though important, was not enough. He had to formulate the plan in such a way as to make it understandable and acceptable to ordinary men. A bill had to be drafted and piloted through the treacherous shoals of the legislature. All this required time, a working knowledge of propaganda technique and a sure grasp of practical politics in Massachusetts. Even with the Massachusetts Savings Bank Insurance Law enacted in 1907, the real work had only begun. The savings bankers themselves had to be convinced that insurance was a suitable and profitable service for them to undertake—no easy task in view of the fact that commercial insurance men, with honest and sincere doubts, often occupied strategic places on the banks' boards of directors. And even with the plan in operation, the job was still unfinished. The law itself had to be kept secure against the persistent and sometimes ingenious efforts of insurance men to destroy or limit it.

Today thirty-eight of the Bay State's 189 savings banks issue savings-bank insurance; 133 other savings banks, five national banks,

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sixteen trust companies, five co-operative banks and seventy-three credit unions act as agencies for it. Only eighteen Bay State savings banks do not offer this service. The insurance now in force totals about $575,000,000, representing 500,000 policies. Since 1939, the Brandeis plan has been functioning in New York, where $300,000,000 of savings-bank insurance has been bought. About $35,000,000 worth has been sold in Connecticut, where the system began operation in 1941. Despite half a century of remarkable progress in Massachusetts, and many years of proved success in New York and Connecticut, there is still plenty of educational work to be done.

Savings-bank insurance represents only a tiny fraction of the billions of life insurance now in force. How then could Brandeis rate it as his "greatest achievement"? Clearly he did not gauge success in terms of the amount of insurance written. "The size of an insurance company [he wrote] is no evidence of energy; . . . the writing of insurance and the control of vast assets is in itself no more evidence of success of an insurance company than the display of a $12,000 rug in the office of its president. In life insurance, success is proved by a small pro rata expense account, a large percentage of return upon absolutely safe investments, and a small per cent of lapsed and surrendered policies." Judged by these standards, especially when compared with the costs and benefits of similar insurance issued by the commercial companies, the Brandeis plan has exceeded even its founder's high expectations.

Savings-bank insurance provides a thrifty substitute for the obsolete house-to-house weekly premium peddling system, wastefully operated by absentee corporations. A full decade before the principle of self-service was introduced in merchandizing, Brandeis had established it in insurance. Under his plan, numerous banks are engaged in selling insurance and annuities; all are actively competing in service and effectiveness of operation. Their goal is not so much higher profit as lower costs. This stress on service-competition within the system has the effect of reducing the burden of insurance cost within the system itself; it also provides an efficiency norm for the entire agency system. Savings-bank life insurance has thus been of incalculable economic benefit even to those who persist in or must continue (no alternative being available) insuring with the commercial companies. It provides a competitive yardstick demonstrating what wage earners' insurance should be and should cost.

Nor is this all. Brandeis saw how the expansion of the savings bank's services so as to include insurance would provide a safeguard against the money-power bigness of metropolitan life insurance. It would help to localize large financial resources in small quasi-public institutions for investment use in the communities served. It would give his favorite "little fellows" an opportunity to participate in and share responsibility for matters of social and economic betterment. It would create in them that vital sense of contributing to the success of something transcending the bounds of self.

ONE WHO observes the success of savings-bank insurance in Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut may wonder why, in view of its tremendous benefits, many more millions in these states have not taken advantage of it, and why other states have not embraced the plan. The answer is twofold: public apathy and the persistent opposition of commercial-insurance interests. For years savings-bank insurance in Massachusetts had to fight for its very existence; insurance interests were determined to destroy it or curtail its scope. In both New York and Connecticut the plan was adopted only after years of struggle against heavy opposition. Of the seventeen states having savings banks, bills have been introduced only in New Jersey, Maine, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Maryland. These efforts failed because the odds imposed by special interests and public inertia were too great. Brandeis would have been neither surprised nor discouraged by this outcome. He knew it would be an uphill fight and was prepared for it. "The waste of democracy," he used to remind any co-worker who faltered, "is among the most obvious wastes."

Today literally scores of his disciples, all schooled in the Brandeis way, are actively promoting the cause of savings-bank life insurance. This is not the result of chance. During his years on the Supreme Court, the Justice was accustomed to stop in Boston each June on the way to his summer home at Chatham, Cape Cod. Political bigwigs, Harvard Law School friends and others often went to the train to "pay their respects," only to find Brandeis closeted in his compartment with Clyde Casady, a young man just out of college, whom Brandeis had successfully prevailed upon to dedicate his life to the cause. Casady and many others like him in Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut persist, despite obstacles and opposition, in spreading the Brandeis gospel.

Brandeis rated the advantages of savings-bank life insurance in human as well as economic terms. Both in inception and operation, it illustrates his basic creed. Seek betterment, he urged, within "the broad lines of existing institutions." Beware of universal remedies for evil conditions. Don't pin too much faith on legislation, on government. Remedial institutions are apt to fall under the control of the enemy and become an instrumentality of oppression. Do not compromise with evil; proceed little by little and leave room for retreat when inevitable error is discovered. Remember that "the development of the individual is both a necessary means and the end sought."

"What we want," he remarked early in the struggle in Massachusetts, "is to have the workingman free; not to have him the beneficiary of a benevolent employer [or a benevolent state], and freedom demands a development in employees of that self-control which results in thrift and in adequate provision for the future."

The significance of savings-bank life insurance extends far beyond the bounds of insurance. On this hundredth anniversary of Brandeis'

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birth, it proclaims his conviction that "success in any democratic institution must proceed from the individual." It demonstrates that in insurance, as in any social undertaking, we cannot depend upon one man or on any one set of men. Savings-bank insurance enlists the support of a wide variety of adherents, the cooperation of all sorts and conditions of men and institutions—the state, the insuring and agency banks, employers and employees, trade unions, credit unions, public-spirited citizens, all working together so that the individual may help himself and thus become by his own efforts more truly independent and more free.

The Brandeis way, as revealed in his insurance plan, is particularly suited to democracy, to the temper of our people and the cast of American institutions. It puts faith in reason and in man's ultimate triumph over whatever difficulties may beset him. "Refuse to accept any evil as inevitable," he implored. "Remember that progress is necessarily slow; that remedies are necessarily tentative; that because of varying conditions there must be much and constant inquiry into facts, and much experimentation." A characteristic of his method is that it reaches no final answers. It does not attempt to organize life on a single principle or pattern. The enduring need is to dare and dare again. As the Justice put it in 1932: "If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."

OKINAWA:
Orphan of Conquest . . by HELEN MEARS

THE Japanese-Soviet agreement, signed last month in Moscow, brought to an end the "state of war" between the two countries, but postponed settlement of certain territorial questions which directly or indirectly involve the United States. Chiefly the spotlight falls on Okinawa, which has been called an American "$588,600,000 investment in security," but which seems likely to turn out to be an investment in legal, strategic and moral bankruptcy.

The island, largest of the Ryukyu chain which stretches in an arc southwest of Japan, has been governed as an absolute U. S. possession and military base for eleven years. Scarcely more than a place-name to most Americans, it made news last August 25 when an A.P. dispatch from London reported that Secretary of State Dulles had warned Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu that, if Japan should sign a peace treaty with the USSR granting the Soviet Union sovereignty over the southern Kurile Islands, the United States could claim sovereignty over Okinawa. This report, amounting to a declaration that under certain conditions the United States might decide to annex Japanese territory some 5,000 miles from our continent and less than 500 miles from China, was sufficiently startling so that Mr. Dulles was asked about it at his next press conference. Since the Secretary's reply is a classic example of open power politics openly arrived at, it is worth noting in full:

> I pointed out . . . as a matter of fact, we had done it before I met with Mr. Shigemitsu in London, that there was an article, Article 26 in the treaty with Japan, which did contain a provision that if a treaty was made with another government on terms more favorable than the Japanese peace treaty which we signed, then we would be entitled to claim similar advantages. This clause was put in the treaty—I wrote the treaty—very largely, as you may remember—for the very purpose of trying to prevent the Soviet Union from getting more favorable treatment than the United States got. I merely reminded the Japanese of the existence of that clause. I did not attempt to indicate what its operation would be or that in fact it would be invoked. I merely pointed out that there was such a clause.

Asked further, "Do you intend to keep Okinawa regardless?", Mr. Dulles replied, "Well we intend to exercise our rights in Okinawa so long as we consider that there is danger to international peace and security in the Asian theatre. No doubt about that."

In openly linking United States control of Okinawa with the Soviet



(1) Karafuto is more commonly known as Sakhalin Island; (2) Kunashiri and Etorofu are two of the southermost islands in the Kuriles; (3) Okinawa is the largest of the Ryukyus.

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control of the Kuriles, Mr. Dulles called attention to the dubiousness of both claims. The Soviet claim to the Kuriles is based on wartime agreements with Roosevelt and Churchill, who declared at Yalta that following the defeat of Japan the islands should "unquestionably" be "handed over to the Soviet Union." But geographically the islands are clearly part of the Japanese chain; the Russians, moreover, had specifically surrendered all claim to them in the 1870s in return for Japanese renunciation of claims to South Sakhalin Island. Even the dubious Cairo formula, which called for Japan to be stripped of all territories "taken by violence and greed," did not remotely apply to the Kuriles, since the Japanese did not acquire title by war, but by exploration, colonization and negotiation. The islands are immeasurably important to the Japanese in terms of fishing rights—which means food; they are important to the USSR only in terms of strategic power.

In questioning the Soviet claims today, however, Mr. Dulles is in a highly equivocal position. His challenge should have been made before the United States signed the Japanese peace treaty. Instead, Mr. Dulles honored the Yalta agreement by writing into the treaty the provision that Japan relinquish sovereignty over the Kuriles. True, the treaty does not specifically assign the islands to the USSR, but that was because the USSR refused to sign the treaty. The United States, however did not challenge the Soviet claim, nor does it do so today. Mr. Dulles merely suggests that the southern islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, are not really part of the Kuriles (though neither the peace treaty nor geographers encouraged this interpretation.

Moreover, any U. S. criticism of Soviet claims to the southern Kuriles is further weakened by the continued United States possession of numerous Japanese islands, south of Japan, of which Okinawa is the most important. In support of their claims, the Russians can at least point to the Big Power wartime agreements; no such agreements were reached concerning the southern Japanese islands. The Potsdam Declaration—which gave the terms for Japan's surrender—declared that Japan's sovereignty would be restricted to her four main islands and "such minor islands as we shall determine." The Japanese had every reason to suppose that these "minor islands" would include the southern chain, with which they had had associations for three centuries. The Ryukyus had been recognized as part of Japan proper for at least three-quarters of a century; Okinawa itself had been a province of Japan since 1879. The "Great Allies," apparently, did not question this claim at any wartime conference.

THE United States took Okinawa as a wartime operation; no one thought of it as a permanent conquest of territory. After Japan's surrender, the island was governed by United States military as part of the Japanese Occupation. During this period, however, the cold war developed. Then, when the Yalta agreements became publicly known, numerous voices in Congress protested that if the Russians were to get the Kuriles, the United States should get the Ryukyus. Increasingly, United States military leaders saw the usefulness of Okinawa as a major base not only to police Japan, but to police China and the USSR. American determination to hold Okinawa was increased by Chiang Kai-shek's steady loss of power on the mainland. Pressure from Congress, the military and the press, as well as the partisan pressure of Republicans who saw the rise of Communist power in China as a strong campaign issue, created a situation which made continued possession of military bases on Japanese territory seem not only defensible but imperative.

When President Truman appointed Mr. Dulles to work out a peace treaty with Japan, the assignment was seen in terms of furthering the assumed strategic advantage of the United States (and appeasing domestic hysteria) rather than as a chance to create the foundation for stability, cooperation and welfare of the peoples of the Far Eastern area. As it developed, Mr. Dulles' treaty brought one war to a close only to become a major act in a new war against two of America's former major allies—China and the USSR. So questionable were the United States arrangements about bases that India and Burma refused even to attend the treaty conference. The USSR attended, but refused to sign. And although China was the country most wronged by Japan, it was not even invited to attend. The British Commonwealth—especially the Asian members—insisted that China should be represented by the Peiping Government; the United States wanted Chiang Kai-shek. The "compromise" was to omit altogether from the peace treaty conference the nation whose historical, legal, practical and moral claims were the strongest of any belligerent.

Among the most questionable provisions of the treaty were those concerning the disposal of Japan's southern islands, including Okinawa. After the war, the United States asked for and received a U.N. trusteeship over those Pacific islands which Japan had held under League of Nations mandate, with the right to declare them a "strategic area"—a classification conferring authority so sweeping as to challenge the prewar concept of Freedom of the Seas. At the U.N., the USSR had assented to these United States claims.

THE MINOR islands south of Japan were not, of course, included in this arrangement. There was no wartime agreement, or formula, which would legalize their retention by the United States. The Potsdam Declaration had implied that any dispute about them would be decided at a peace-treaty conference. But the conference, when it was held, proved to be one in name only. Mr. Dulles held a series of bilateral conversations and then worked out a document ("I wrote it myself"), and presented it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. His solution for Okinawa (and the other "minor" islands) was to leave their sovereignty in doubt but to arrange for absolute United States possession for an indefinite period. This was accomplished by a provision through which the Japanese

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promised to "concur" with any proposal the United States might make to place several groups of islands, including Okinawa, under a U.N. trusteeship; and providing that until such a proposal was made and accepted, the United States should retain "the right to exercise all and any power of administration legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters."

The United States, however, never did apply for a trusteeship over the Ryukyus and other "minor" islands. Instead, a new formula was developed by which the United States (unilaterally) returned "residual sovereignty" to Japan, but reaffirmed United States rights to control the area as an absolute possession "for the foreseeable future." This formula, first publicly asserted by Secretary Dulles in late 1953, was made explicit in Japan in June, 1956, when Ambassador Allison announced that Okinawa would be returned to Japan "when tensions relax in the Far East." It was reaffirmed by Mr. Dulles on August 28 when he declared that "we intend to exercise our rights in Okinawa so long as we consider that there is danger to international peace and security in the Asian theater. No doubt about that."

Mr. Dulles' statement of intention to hold Okinawa, juxtaposed to his hints of U. S. action should Japan grant the USSR sovereignty over the southern Kuriles, suggests that his aim is to prevent a Japanese-Soviet treaty agreement. But the Russians are not likely to yield a position buttressed by a wartime agreement, especially as long as Washington continues to hold territory on the basis of no agreement whatever.

MR. DULLES justifies the turning of Okinawa into an American "Gibraltar" on the grounds of "tension" in the Far East. It is obvious, however, that the American bases in Japan and Okinawa are themselves a primary source of tension. It is possible to argue that had the United States not insisted on retaining these bases, the USSR might have agreed to relinquish its claims to the Kuriles. It is on record that the USSR did, in fact, yield important territorial and economic advantages on mainland China which had been granted to it at Yalta. If, instead of trying to isolate Japan from the continent, the United States had agreed to its neutralization (which, at the time the peace treaty was written, the overwhelming majority of Japanese appeared to desire), and if the United States had renounced its bases in Japan and had withdrawn from the Ryukyus, Washington would have been warmly supported by the "neutralist" Asian nations. And if, confronted with such concrete evidence of United States good faith, the USSR had still insisted on retaining the Kuriles, Asian suspicion would have been transferred unequivocally from the United States to the Soviet Union.

The Japanese and Russians have held conversations, off and on for years, trying to work out a peace treaty. These conversations always bogged down, largely on the territorial issue. On Oct. 19, however, a compromise solution was announced from Moscow, where the Japanese Premier Hatayama and the Soviet Premier Bulganin signed an agreement which ended the "state of war" and re-established "peace and good-neighborly, friendly relations" without a formal "peace treaty." The agreement by-passed the territorial issue except to state that the USSR agreed to "hand over" the Habomai and Shikotan islands (close to Japan's northern island of Hokkaido), "after the conclusion of a peace treaty." There was no reference to the disputed Kuriles. It is obvious that, like the U. S. government, the USSR is determined to hold on to its "strategic" islands as long as "tensions" exist.

In the meantime, U.S.-USSR strategic rivalry leaves 90,000,000 Japanese people trapped between the pincers of Soviet bases to the North and U. S. bases to the South. The Japanese know that if war should break out there is an excellent chance that their homeland will be vaporized. American bases in Japan proper are seen by many not as a defense but as a provocation, and as a usurpation of land. Frequent riots have occurred as U. S. military installations take more and more land from the desperately land-poor farmers in order to build ever longer runways for nuclear bombers.

Similarly, the ever-growing bastion on Okinawa appears to be backfiring on both the strategic and political levels. Conditions for 800,000 people of the Ryukyus, under U. S. military rule, have grown so desperate that riots and organized complaints have been serious enough to induce a Congressional investigation and to cause some Congressmen to speculate whether "native" discontent might not endanger American forces on Okinawa in the event of war. There is no disagreement about the fact that the Okinawan people want to belong to Japan and want our bases out of their island. While our naval and air power in the Far East steadily increases, our influence and prestige steadily diminish.

THE situation today in Okinawa dramatizes the fact that political policies based on assumed strategic advantage rather than on human needs are likely to be self-defeating. How well does it serve American political aims in Asia when the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo is subjected to the humiliation of being presented by the Japanese Foreign Minister with a complaint from Japanese citizens in Okinawa asking for help against inhumane treatment from their American rulers? How much does it add to U. S. prestige in Asia to have the Japan Civil Liberties Union publish a report of conditions in Okinawa which describes American payment of Okinawa labor as at "slave-labor" rates? In what way does it advance American professed objectives to take and use for military installations over 40 per cent of the Okinawa farmers' arable land, dispossessing and impoverishing an estimated 76,000 families?

In our treatment of the Okinawan people, our government is giving a demonstration of the American Way in practice in Asia. It is not a demonstration likely to gain friends for us in that part of the world. As Mr. Dulles so often points out, deeds speak louder than words.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

France Beneath the Surface

FRANCE: 1940-1955. By Alexander Werth. Introduction by G. D. H. Cole. Henry Holt and Co. $6.

By Harvey Goldberg

WHATEVER the measure—depth, breadth, or integrity—Alexander Werth has written the best book on contemporary France which has yet appeared in any language. While an assorted company of half-amused, half-outraged critics, led by the overpraised Herbert Lüthy, have prepared us for the imminent death of France (victim of communism, neutralism, inefficiency, and even damnable independence), Mr. Werth has rescued us from that meaningless *cul de sac* and put us squarely on the highroad of serious history. Intimate witness to scores of events and omnivorous reader of the pertinent documents, he has walked almost unerringly through the complex political maze of France. He has organized, weighed, sifted, and evaluated the data of Vichy, the Resistance, and the Fourth Republic with the care of a professional historian and the concern of a sensitive progressive. His performance is positively dazzling.

The great bulk and detail of this massive account (some of it repetitious, but most of it extremely rewarding) rest firmly on several major propositions, which go far toward revealing the deep realities of contemporary France and her surface movements.

1) Werth recognizes the continuity in French history, the perpetuation in innumerable cloaks of those powerful social elements which, never having accepted the great Revolution of 1789, have bitterly (and successfully) frustrated liberty, equality and fraternity for a century and a half. "Vichy was not an accident; Vichyism goes far back into the past."

Werth has grasped, however, more than just continuity; he has perceived the underlying unity of rightist ideology. In this he stands closer to Beau de Loménie or Simone de Beauvoir than to René Rémond. Rémond demonstrated historically in *La Droite en France* that the concept of the Right can be categorized ideologically into traditional conservatism, Bonapartism, and economic liberalism. But in three magisterial volumes, *Les Responsabilités des dynasties bourgeoises,* Beau de Loménie stressed the continuous fusion of aristocrats, capitalists, and Bonapartists into a phalanx of powerful bourgeois families, for whom differences of political method were rendered insignificant by the common goal of defending economic privileges. Similarly, Simone de Beauvoir recently reviewed the thought of the Right and underscored the unity of its various positions—all springing from fear of social change, belief in elite rule, pessimism about the future—a single tradition masquerading in the guise of variety.

Werth refers to the categories of the Right, but he understands the connection of the parts. Vichy, the National Revolution, proclaimed the return to the traditional values of corporate, clerical France. "The truth, of course, is that, for all its corporatist jargon Vichy France was, in fact, essentially capitalist, with the trusts, financial oligarchies, and big business being their own masters as seldom before."

When the social renovation and moral housecleaning, proclaimed in the Resistance and the Liberation, had been checked (by 1946) the Right, whose roots had never been plucked, sprouted once again. De Gaulle, that "noble anachronism," the great rebel soldier who would not admit defeat in the face of Nazi power, had found himself after the struggle more comfortable among traditional conservatives than among his recent comrades. As early as 1944, "he would no longer use the word 'Revolution', and preferred the vague word 'Renovation', implying merely a few improvements to the Law and Order." By lending his support to the nationalization program of the Liberation period and attracting to his side men as socially conscious as Capitant and Soustelle, de Gaulle could well appear to be a kind of Jacobin, long associated with the Bonapartist tradition. But Werth found in the RPF's drumbeats for the *feodalités* and for the anti-Communist holy war the rhythm of a more familiar Right.

The *laissez-faire* Right, showing no shame for its sins of the past, was crystallized in as short a time as it took M. Laniel and his breed to organize in December, 1945, against the *dirgisme* of the Fourth Republic. In the fertile soil of unbelievable political mediocrity (the names of Queuille, Pleven, and René Mayer spring at once to mind), the economic liberalism of a classical bourgeois Right became everywhere conspicuous—in the black market rackets, the wild and uncontrolled inflation, and the undisturbed reign of the overseas *colons*. By the time little M. Pinay, erstwhile member of Pétain's National Council, donned the mantle of premier on March 6, 1952, Vichyites, Gaullists, and classical liberals were engaged in a well-synchronized *danse macabre* around the dying hope of the Resistance.

2) WERTH has associated the resurgent Right with the failure to achieve an effective Left in the Fourth Republic. The results of such a misfortune are apparent in the contemporary economic order. As

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Pierre-Henri Simon observed in *Le Monde* on June 30, 1955, "in the last fifteen years the economic conditions among the wage earners as a whole have not improved, and have remained slightly below, rather than slightly above, the 1938 level, despite longer working hours." What had happened then to the great spirit of Resistance? Men of many stripes had fought together with considerable effectiveness (General Eisenhower considered the *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* the equal of at least fifteen divisions) and with unmatched bravery; and whatever their individual differences, these men and women had manifested a kind of common spirit, which, as Gilles Martinet put it, "could lead to only one thing—which was socialism."

It didn't happen, of course; and with heightened acuity Werth has attributed the failure to the collapse of the Resistance coalition, which took the Communists from effective governmental partnership to far-from-splendid isolation, the Socialists from key ideological importance to incredible sterility, and the MRP from passionate social Catholicism to old-fashioned conservatism.

Werth, who has spent a quarter of a century in France, is fully (and explicitly) aware of the French Communist Party's terrible blunders, not the least of which was its stupid response to the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 (when, in choosing between French and Russian national interest, it ended up serving neither). But once the Communists had joined the war effort, their role changed and whatever credit Werth has assigned to them emerges from the record. In the Resistance they were, to quote Beuve-Méry, the *aile marchante;* and in the period of de Gaulle's presidency, Thorez insisted upon their willingness to remain part of a progressive governmental coalition. It was not to be, and Werth has placed the blame less on the Communists than on other forces.

In Werth's analysis of this breakdown of symbiosis between CP and the non-Communist political community, there is a crucial implication that it was impossible to build an effective reforming Left without the Communists and that it may be impossible to reckon without them in the future. However idiotic have been the reversals of the Party line, the glorification of things Russian, the purges within the Party, Werth has suggested to French leftists, who resist living with Communists, that they probably can't live without them. For in broad sectors of French society, "there is the conscious acceptance of the fact that the French Communists cannot be altogether detached from an historically valid and even 'respectable' French revolutionary tradition."

3) WERTH has contended that the crucial factor in the destruction of *tripartisme* was the corrosive impact of the Cold War on French political life. It is almost astonishing (and a measure of this historian's talents) that Werth has written not only the most meaningful histories of Vichy, the Resistance, and postwar French politics, but also, in a book on France, one of the few incisive accounts of the Cold War and its impact. Naturally, his references to the actual policies of the United States and Russia are marginal to his main narrative. But his study of the effect in France of the American program for Western Europe goes further than many sterile monographs on dollar aid in explaining the essence of the Cold War. Only a writer for whom historical research is an instrument of understanding, not a mere edifice of documents, could have done it.

As early as June, 1944, the clandestine newspaper *Aurore* wrote that "these Vichy gentlemen have now found the Road to Damascus. They are playing the American card. It is their supreme hope. At Vichy they go on whispering all over the place that, being afraid of the USSR, America will facilitate the creation in the West of an anti-Bolshevik barrier. . . ." A prescient comment for a period marked by external collaboration between the U. S. and the USSR! For if France were to be drawn into a Western alliance against the East, the Left would disintegrate and the Right would move in.

Werth has demonstrated that the French resisted such involvement, motivated by a kind of inherent neutralism, which expressed their devotion to European civilization. De Gaulle's insistence that France could not be a pawn in an East-West game of power was part of the atmosphere in which *tripartisme* had a chance. But the progress of the Cold War was relentless. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of September 5, 1946, announced a new Germany and set off the trend toward a polarized Western Europe. The Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, dangled aid before the eyes of those powers fighting communism. And the American pressure on France to grant bases and to isolate its Communists finally bore the expected fruit.

4) FAR FROM assigning France to the ashcan of history, Werth has credited her with a profound accomplishment in the discouraging postwar decade and has revealed her resources for a significant future. In spite of the terrible involvement in Indo-China and North Africa, she has remained always a reluctant, questioning, unenthusiastic participant in the most provocative acts of world affairs. Bourdet expressed a widespread French feeling when he

Tiresias' Lament

I touch and recollect
Less than the shape and shade
Of formal colonnade.
Unwilling architect

Of the uncloistered mind,
I compass touch and time,
Trace lines on the sublime.
Ridiculous and blind,

I stumble in the crowd;
Fools—still they envy me
For this thin prophecy—
Time's cheat, and living's shroud.

Men, I have known your might,
Women, your subtler grace;
Seen in love's double face
Love's singular delight;

And now what am I made?
Less than each one I was,
The present gives small pause
To my time-ruined shade.

I curse the blackened sun;
Sight was too dear a cost
For this, which shall be lost
Before what is, is done.

ELLEN DE YOUNG KAY

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wrote in 1947: "We are told that we must choose between the USSR and the U. S., between East and West, between Right and Left, between de Gaulle and the Communists. Must we give up our desperate desire to represent a civilization on the narrow margin between two worlds?" Our American commentators have not looked kindly upon such a view, variously described as blind, selfish, even subversive. Mr. Lüthy, too, gravely reminded the French that "France cannot live alone." But Werth has found in "her sharply critical attitude, her skepticism, and even her moments of pessimism" that powerful support for caution which helped to save life itself.

AS TO the future, Werth offers not certainty but possibility. However hardheaded his realism, he would hardly enshroud the coming decades in *fin de siècle* gloom. It is tempting for the critic, in the manner of American tourists who despair of disgraceful housing, impossible bureaucracy, and conspicuous inefficiency, to assume that France will fiddle (or drink) her way into obscurity. But not Werth, though more than others he has understood the magnitude of her social problems. Indeed, had he added to his already vast panorama the one dimension which it lacks, an analysis of production and distribution realities, the job to be done would, for good reason, appear mountainous. For France has produced neither competitively nor well, nor has her national product reached the public in fair shares.

But for the observer like Werth, who has feasted long on the "lively and brilliant intelligence of the French intellectual and technical elite," there can be no total despair. A nation in which "nearly all the best writers—all the way from Mauriac and Malraux to Sartre, Camus, Aragon, and Eluard—have been *engagés*"—is one rich in ideas for the future. A nation in which lives the conscience of a Mauriac, who stands awake even while Cassandra sleeps, will not lack for moral passion. A nation whose bourgeoisie can produce a Mendès-France may yet reckon with vital reformism. And all these great French resources can be mined as the Cold War ebbs.

Tradition and Transition

THINGS OF THIS WORLD. By Richard Wilbur. Harcourt, Brace. $3.

THREE PRIESTS IN APRIL. By Stephen Stepanchev. Contemporary Poetry. $3.

ONE FOOT IN EDEN. By Edwin Muir. Grove Press. $3.

By M. L. Rosenthal

TO LIBERATE oneself from "influences" that not only guide but bully, it is sometimes necessary to reach back behind them, to their own sources. Many contemporary poets, in their several ways and with varying clearsightedness, are now making this effort—an effort to get in touch anew with the root-motivations animating the Romantics, the French Symbolists, the experimentalists of thirty *and* of sixty or seventy years ago, and their other literary ancestors. The currently renewed fascination with sacred and mythological themes indicates even more the effort at self-rediscovery.

The transitions are not easy, especially when there is only dim consciousness of what is happening, and the distress signals are everywhere, and everywhere different. Thus, in *Things of This World* Richard Wilbur seems beset by a sort of ennui, the result of a conceptual dependence which bedevils him with an especially treasonous subtlety. Though he is still one of our better poets, the things his poetry says and lives by are so much of the essence of the modern Anglo-American heritage that others have already preëmpted the original and audacious modes of expression he might otherwise use. Compare his "An Event" with Stevens' "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird," for instance. The younger poet has been almost forced into a blander, more discursive tack, for which even his highly developed grace and skill of rhetoric cannot fully compensate. Rhetoric, incidentally, is put to sharper use in the one political piece here: "Speech for the Repeal of the McCarran Act." Genuine poetic energy and concreteness quicken the effect of this piece, which augurs the revival of a genre recently much neglected. But this poet's main chance does not lie in a political direction.

Wilbur's own medicine for his disease is, for him, a good one: translation, and a turn of emphasis toward French sources that goes with it. His dominating vision has always been the aesthetic-secular one of the post-Romantic tradition:

> I take this world for better or for worse,
> But seeing rose carafes conceive the sun
> My thirst conceives a fierier universe.

Still, Wilbur finds it difficult, in his usual voice, to present this vision as truth; he rather argues for it as an ideal. Everything changes, however, when he takes on a different voice or mask by translating from the French. Then, particularly in rendering Baudelaire's *"L'Invitation au Voyage"* and Valéry's "Helen," he is at once far within the vision. Again, with Jammes' "A Prayer to Go to Paradise with the Donkeys," he is from the start at a pitch of pure elation for which he strives in vain elsewhere. Moreover, of the successful poems here that are *not* translations, the best are those most closely approaching the dream-atmosphere of the French Symbolist tradition (as opposed to the Emersonian or morally melioristic streak in contemporary American poetry, which has at times overborne Wilbur's sense of himself). Such poems are "Merlin Enthralled" and "Marginalia," the latter of which tells us that

> Descending into sleep (as when the night-lift
> Falls past a brilliant floor), we glimpse a sublime
> Décor and hear, perhaps, a complete music...

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STEPHEN STEPANCHEV writes of "blue, gambling probables in curves," of "fire-drunk, winged Icarus," of how "all space became an ear as I waited." A delicate yet durable poet with a touch of metaphysical slyness, he gives us deceptive pictures. These pictures, even when at first apparently static, continue to grow after first they come into view, remolding themselves and emerging in altered perspective:

> The ruffed, black auerhahn,
> Passion's gold-eyed cock,
> Has paced ten thousand years
> Among snow-surpliced rocks
> Beyond reed, rose, and oak
> In highest Bavaria.

Sometimes too—we could wish more often—the movement is swifter from the start; there is for a moment the same swooping vertigo before the adjustment of psychological lenses that characterizes many Hart Crane poems:

> I saw red acres dumb beneath a stream
> Of swollen suns. An itching plow had sprung
> The ring dream of a stroking, bearded green,
> Waiting for a rain of wheat.

There are other resemblances to Crane, for in both poets the tragedy of lost faith and of personal "displacement" appears as a theme in a variety of paradoxical guises. But Stepanchev usually wears these guises with a lightly bantering, slightly evasive air, reciting meanwhile, it may be, some little allegorical anecdote or fable. Thus he skirts both the dangers and the dynamic possibilities of Crane's more brilliant and more desolate irony. For a writer like Stepanchev, Crane's way would be fatal; it demands enormous power and for writers without that power leads inevitably to the slough of despond and piddling self-pity. They need to remove themselves from the pull of bleakness-for-its-own-sake, as Stepanchev wisely and adroitly does again and again. His title poem, in fact the title *Three Priests in April* itself, is thoroughly in point. It reaches its darkly bitter denouement only through a bright sensory shimmer of color and sound, "a green fire in dusty snow" while "Plato's music arched the dial of day."

In general, Stepanchev's seriousness is not so much of demeanor as of mind and heart. Few of his pieces directly sustain any note of outright revulsion or disillusionment; the note tends to be sweeter and thinner, it may even be whimsical, but it is also intellectually and morally tough in the attitude it sings. Although his interests are modern enough, he shrugs off lugubriousness with un-Romantic ease; indeed, his combination of deft, gay impressionism with a surprisingly moralistic bent gives his work a definitely classical turn. Where defeat does hang in the air, as it does about "Alp" and a number of other poems, it is the kind of defeat which in classical comedy is at the same time a coming to his senses by the protagonist. This small first volume, a distillation from perhaps fifteen years' work by a poet best known in little magazines, is the product of a fine lyric ear, a sophisticated and independent discipline, and a rare modesty.

ALMOST seventy now, Edwin Muir has seen his reputation grow considerably in the past decade or so. Partly we may attribute this increased recognition to what might be called his explorations in religious orthodoxy, of which *One Foot in Eden* now marks a culmination. No other poetry that I have recently seen so beautifully embodies the convergence of Judaic, Christian, and Grecian (mythological) ideals with those of humane secularism that now colors so much of modern thought. Whether one resists or welcomes—from whatever viewpoint—this convergence is irrelevant; Muir's writing shows its deep subjective anchoring and some of the ways it satisfies needs both elementary and complex.

Although these poems are often devout in tone, they are not to be identified with the externalized religious "revival" now packing the churches and synagogues with its vague promise of "a sense of belonging." Muir brings us directly back to the recognition of mysteries such as Eliot's "Gerontion" calls for: "Signs are taken for wonders. 'We would see a sign!'" We sometimes forget that French Symbolist poetry aimed, as C. M. Bowra puts it, to secure through art "the ecstasies which religion claims for the devout through prayer and contemplation." Muir's connection with the Symbolists is clear, and in addition he returns very emphatically in *One Foot in Eden* to the symbols both of Biblical and mythical traditions and of common experience. "The Annunciation" gives us storied mystery as fact:

> The angel and the girl are met.
> Earth was the only meeting place.
> For the embodied never yet
> Travelled beyond the shore of space.
> The eternal spirits in freedom go.

And, at the other end of the scale, "The Island" chants the mystery of what is known through physical experience:

> Men are made of what is made,
> The meat, the drink, the life, the corn,
> Laid up by them, in them reborn.

Yet the poems are never "merely" religious in a stock sense. Thus, there is more compassion and awe than doctrine in "The Animals." squarely based though it is on the Old Testament; similarly, while in "Outside Eden" the forlorn but unquestioning piety of the true believer takes on heroic dimensions, the *truth* of what he believes so truly is not brought into consideration. Muir once wrote that "There is a vast area of life which science leaves in its original mystery; and this is the area with which poetry deals, or should deal." In the present volume he deals with just this area, and if one added "dogmatic theology" to "science" one would doubtless not be distorting his meaning. The ambiguities of faith are part of his subject, and in this and other respects he approaches the complex skepticism of Yeats.

If I have suggested that *One Foot in Eden* is interesting mainly because of the way it handles the problem of belief, I have fallen into a trap of my own making. In its own right it is poetry of a rich though quiet intensity and of enormous emotional concentration. This visionary Orkney Islander, another of our modern semi-metaphysicals, feels—so sharply that he can touch it—the reciprocal elusiveness of experience and of thought; hence the

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ease of his movement between "real" observation and insight on the one hand and abstractions on the other. The beautiful imagistic poems "Double Absence," "The Late Swallow," and "The Late Wasp" are also philosophic poems without at all straining to be so, while "Nothing But Faith" and "The Grave of Prometheus" bring theoretical conceptions to tangible realization. A few poems, such as "Effigies" and "The Horses," encompass all these considerations through their prophetic scope and, without hubris or ranting, are informed by a transcendent disinterestedness, pity, unsqueamishness of psychological probing, and proffering of hope (but with no *promises)* for the future.

THEATRE

Harold Clurman

I HAD THOUGHT as I sat down to write this review of Bernard Shaw's *The Apple Cart* (Plymouth Theatre) to devote myself mainly to a comparison of the present production with one I saw in London a few years ago in which Noel Coward and Margaret Leighton played the leading roles. But not only would this be unfair to the New York cast and to the reader who had not seen the play in London, but it would be the kind of evasion of criticism which I frequently complain about when revivals of presumably familiar plays are presented on our stage. We must begin with and for the most part stick to Shaw's text.

To focus on the "show" aspect of the production instead of on its content would be to indicate something of which *The Apple Cart* is itself a reflection. Most of us nowadays dislike thinking of politics. We harbor a vague sense of futility about it. Our political talk becomes, even in our own view, mere intellectual chit-chat without much personal or social relevance.

The Apple Cart was written in 1929 when Shaw was seventy-three. England was prosperous with the sort of prosperity about which the king in the play, and Shaw himself, were apprehensive. Shaw had become more than skeptical about the outer forms of democracy. The Labor (or Coalition) government of Ramsay MacDonald was hardly more reassuring to him than a Conservative government might have been. "Breakages, Ltd." (the play's symbol for capitalism) still ruled the roost, and the cabinet in the play suffers a sense of weary or regretful fatalism about it. Contemporary politics, Shaw implies, with gleaming irony and diminishing optimism, is mostly illusion and delusion. Only the philosopher-king—that is, the truly thinking man not engaged in vote catching or momentary local victories—is aware of the operative problems. And he becomes increasingly conscious that his awareness by itself, although irreducible and inalienable, cannot yet move mountains.

The play is beautifully written—it is clear, elegant, pithy, and has a certain aristocratic grace of Anglo-Protestant character. We cannot fail to be charmed by it. It is also brilliantly constructed: for we are given a long series of rather "abstract" discussion—abstract in the sense that there is little plot except as to whether or not the king shall declare himself a nonentity as his cabinet demands—but Shaw, by introducing a delightful episode in which he interrupts the political debate to reveal his own relationship to women, sustains our interest and handsomely entertains us despite what might first appear arid material.

YET, I ask myself, what does an American (Broadway) audience today get out of all this? When he wrote the play, Shaw must have hoped that, while it would provide an intelligently amusing evening for a civilized audience, the play might also trouble that audience—move it at least to think further of the political dilemmas of the time. But now, I fear, the play indirectly encourages the profound political apathy of our public. When, for example, Shaw quips about the bootlessness of most election results, our audience applauds with a certain gleeful appreciation of his contemporaneity and cleverness. "We really felt all along," the audience seems to be saying, "that all the political stuff we hear about and indulge ourselves in is the bunk—and in this play that wise old bird Shaw tells us that we are right." The only difference is that Shaw was a little sore at heart about it, whereas we simply remain ignorant and complacent. For while it is true that the trappings of politics are generally ridiculous, the core of the matter is of the utmost seriousness.

Yes, it is a good show. The production is good-looking and the actors—Maurice Evans, Signe Hasso, Charles Carson and others—work hard and well at it. Sometimes they work too hard. The long speeches and the need for silken diction are a strain on most companies today; so that the light fluency, the air of superior mental capacity and free-wheeling wit are not complete. But we must not be captious. We are lucky to see the play again.

TELEVISION

Anne W. Langman

SHORTLY after eight p.m. on election night 1952, Univac click-clacked its way through miles of statistics and predicted to CBS viewers hundred-to-one odds on victory for General Eisenhower. Startled statisticians and newsmen entreated the electronic brain to come up with a more reasonable answer but Univac ignored its timid masters with scornful consistency. Then a new set of figures was fed the monster and in a matter of seconds it obediently changed its electronic mind. A trend-

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hungry nation went back to commentators' interpretation of returns, and dismissed the unbelievable prediction as an example of technological wool-gathering. Hours later we discovered that the big brain had been right in the first place.

So Univac established a place for itself and its family of electronic computing machines on TV, and in the intervening four years they have been type cast as unassailable champions of truth and honesty. *The $64,000 Question* uses one to guard the questions until Hal March pushes a button and is electronically presented with a category; the public is instantly reassured, knowing that machines, like elephants, never tell. There's one called Datatron that picks the winners of football games every Saturday afternoon in a statistically scientific manner. A similarly unimpassioned scorekeeper will be the final determinant in the search for "The Most Beautiful Girl in the World." Carrying the scientific approach even further, Art Linkletter employed Univac on his *People Are Funny* show a few weeks ago to select a mate for an attractive young widow who seemed to regard the great brain with close to filial respect.

We're now back to election night again and this time a large assortment of computing machines will be put to work on the returns: analyzing, predicting trends and forecasting results. Speed of transmitting this story may well rescue TV news-staffers from the dilemma of having to give this biggest quadrennial news event the full visual treatment even though in essence it is not a visual story. To a nation of acquisitive news-hounds, knowing a fact five seconds before someone else knows it is a matter for excitement and pride, and the machines will add speed and accuracy to the unfolding of the election story. They have the further appeal of the unknown, these mysterious, lumbering giants, who can calculate in a matter of seconds computations which would occupy pencil-and-paper statisticians for hundreds of man-hours.

Down at Univac headquarters at Remington Rand, Max Woodbury, professor of mathematics at New York University, is completing four years of collecting every possible relevant statistic and feeding it to his charge for the great election night performance. "Most people think these computors are magic," he said, "but they're not. Univac is a tool—a rather fabulous tool—and it takes a lot of hard work, time and money to make it perform its assignments." As we inspected the roomful of cabinets which make up the "brain," I asked Dr. Woodbury whether changes would be made to input again, should Univac come up with another wild guess. "That was my goof," he admitted ruefully. "I know from Gallup and others that it was supposed to be a close election and I just couldn't believe the prediction. But this time it will stand as delivered." CBS newsman Elmer Lower concurred; he expects Univac to extrapolate figures fed to it from the CBS newsroom, come up with a prediction as early and as accurately as possible on who the next President of the United States will be and who will control the House and Senate.

JOHN DALY at ABC will pit human brains against Elecom, junior size data-processing unit of the Underwood Company. His staff has chosen fifty-four bellweather election units around the country, historically proven as barometers of trends, and they will project their predictions on early returns from these. Elecom, described by Dr. Leon Nemerever, chief of its mathematical keepers, as "a great stupid giant who moves with the speed of light," will process mass data and come up with *its* predictions. Making its debut on Tuesday night, this machine divides its work between a file clerk unit and a bookkeeper unit. Its ancestor was a bookkeeper unit which was slowed up by having to sort and file, complained of overwork, and, speaking no English, put out its message in the binary number system which had to be decoded by old-fashioned human brains. Although Elecom has learned its letters and numbers, it will be another five years before it can read a printed page, Dr. Nemerever told me. He added rather wistfully that right now there's a machine in the Washington D.C. post office that sorts the mail.

A multi-million dollar array of IBM and Teleregister equipment will be used by NBC. Operators will translate state and national returns to punch cards to be fed into the electronic brain called 650. Here the figures will be checked for accuracy by the machine's memory and added to previous totals. In a fraction of a second, percentage of precincts reporting, state and national totals, and the electoral vote will be computed. 650 passes along this information to 402, a printer, to teleregister boards for TV audience to see, to 705, the giant brain for trend interpretation and to a sorter which can extract any variety of categories called for by newsmen.

In more senses than one is happy to admit, this election bids fair to be a victory for the well-fed machine.

TELEVISION NEXT WEEK

November 6 through 10

(See local papers for time and channel)

Tuesday, November 6

ELECTION NIGHT (All networks). Newsmen and machines (see above) will cover the election story until the results are clear. Murrow and Sevareid (CBS), Huntley and Brinkeley (NBC), John Daly (ABC).

Wednesday, November 7

GIANT STEP (CBS). Premiere of junior quiz show for the 7 to 17 age group. Top prizes include a four-year college education and trips abroad, which will no doubt equip winners whose nerves hold up for appearances on the grown-up brain racks.

Thursday, November 8

1957 ROCKET REVUE (ABC). John Daly, the newsman and host of "What's

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My Line?" adds another master of ceremony job to his schedule with this girls and music show.

THE BIG SLIDE (CBS; Playhouse 90). A 90-minute drama written for TV by Edward Beloin and Dean Reisner, recounting the up and down career of a famous silent film comedian. Shirley Jones (of the non-silent *Oklahoma* and *Carousel*) stars in her first straight dramatic role, with Red Skelton and others.

Saturday, November 10

TONIGHT AT 8:30 (ABC; Famous Film Festival). Screen versions of Noel Coward's *Red Peppers, Fumed Oak* and *Ways and Means*.

MUSIC

B. H. Haggin

IT WAS interesting to see in the Berlin Philharmonic, at Carnegie Hall recently, only a few scattered gray-haired musicians who might have been in the orchestra when I last heard it in concert, in London in 1928, with Furtwaengler conducting. What was astonishing was the number—possibly a dozen—of unbelievably young players who looked as though they had been snatched from the conservatory at twenty—among them one of the cellists at the first desk, whose companion looked only a couple of years older. Both of these facts had something to do with what I heard: the finished execution, the beauty of sonority achieved by a personnel that was first-rate throughout.

An orchestra plays as it is conducted; and the execution and sonority I heard were evidence of von Karajan's mastery in the handling of his instrument. But in addition they were manifestations of his personal taste and style in musical performance. As in his performances with the London Philharmonia a year ago, he used his mastery to get the orchestra to play with remarkable delicacy and refinement of tone and execution in performances that were low-keyed in sonority and color. Not only Mozart's Violin Concerto K.219 was treated in this way, but Strauss's *Don Juan*, and even the first movement of Beethoven's *Eroica* Symphony: not until the climaxes of the second movement did von Karajan begin to produce tuttis of maximum orchestral volume. But even with such tuttis the symphony as it was played on this occasion lacked the power, the tension, the intensity it should have; and at maximum volume the orchestral sonorities lost their radiance and brilliance and were dry and lusterless. Or at least that was how they sounded in row N of Carnegie Hall, which may have been too close.

The soloist in the Mozart concerto was Wolfgang Schneiderhan, who played with clear, sweet tone and with phrasing that was in good taste but unenlivening.

The American Opera Society opened its season with Handel's *Julius Caesar* in place of the originally announced *L'Africaine* of Meyerbeer; and the first moments—with routine writing by Handel and rough-voiced singing by Siepi—were unpromising. But with the lament of Cornelia and Sextus and the singing of Florence Kopleff and Russell Oberlin one began to hear beautiful music beautifully sung; and this continued with the arias and duets of Caesar and Cleopatra, in which Siepi's quieter singing was very fine, and Leontyne Price's lovely voice, her musical phrasing and her security and brilliance in florid passages were breathtaking. Arnold U. Gamson's conducting again provided the singing with an effective orchestral context.

EPIC SC-6013 offers a performance by the Slovenian National Opera of Ljubljana of Prokofiev's youthfully exuberant and inventive music for *The Love for Three Oranges*. The soloists comprise a good mezzo-soprano, fair sopranos, adequate tenors and rough basses; the chorus and orchestra are second-rate. The lack of a libretto makes it difficult to correlate music with action.

On London LL-1394 is a performance of Fauré's lovely Requiem, in which Ansermet conducts L'Union chorale de la tour de Peilz and L'Orchestre de la Suisse romande with Danco and Souzay as soloists. The male voices of the chorus are a little dry, the female voices a little shrill; otherwise the performance is very beautiful.

Columbia ML-5099 offers several instrumental and vocal pieces by Schoenberg—the Suite Op. 29, the Canon for String Quartet, the Two Pieces for Piano Op. 33, the *Herzgewaechse* Op. 20, the Cantata *The New Classicism* Op. 28 and the Three Songs Op. 48—which to my ears are hideous musical objects that convey no coherent musical sense. They are performed by various groups under the direction of Robert Craft, whose accompanying notes are as incomprehensible as the music they undertake to explain.

THE Cherubini Symphony that Toscanini recorded is a dull piece from whose composer one would never expect the superb dramatic melody of the opera *Medea* that the American Opera Society performed last year, or the lovely choral writing of the Requiem Mass in C minor that Toscanini performs with the Robert Shaw Chorale and the NBC Symphony on RCA Victor LM-2000. The beautiful performance is the one he broadcast in February, 1950; and the recording processed from the original NBC acetates reproduces it with good sound when one cuts down the peaked treble.

VANGUARD has put on Bach Guild 552 the performance of Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach's *Magnificat* that was on three sides of 516/7. The work is a fine one, with several impressive fast movements and touching slow movements; and the performance conducted by Prohaska is excellent.

In Dufay's *Missa Caput*, sung well on Oiseau-Lyre 50069 by the Ambrosian Singers, a male chorus, under Denis Stevens' direction, each section contains lovely polyphony which my ear finds unvarying and therefore monotonous.

In addition to the famous recording of Gregorian Chant by the Monks' Choir of the Abbey of Saint-Pierre de Solesmes that Victor reissued on LCT-6011, there are new LP recordings of the choir's beautiful singing on London LSA-17, which deals with the Ordinary of the Mass and the Mass for the Dead, and London LL-1408, which is concerned with Easter.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 696

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Bound to result in a loss of inspiration. (13)
10 and 13 The donor alone is out of character. (5, 5)
11 Even someone like Bolivar might fly nowadays. (9)
12 His is not a very agreeable disposition. (9)
13 See 10 across
14 Leave intellectual ditties, if you know Kipling. (12)
19 Not the quality of things found in revue. (It might cause difficulty in getting on with the ride.) (12)
22 Wasn't too happy about the grade reduction! (5)
24 Might have been delivered by the cat, at one time. (9)
25 Callithump. (9)
26 Her initial anger belies her peaceful reputation. (5)
27 His knowledge is not necessarily only skin-deep. (13)

DOWN:

2 Essential in the delivery of both rocket and rapier. (6)
3 Is it a cause of humiliation that not all houses have one? (9)
4 Even a saint would be upset after the celebration—they evidently deserved a letter. (9)
5 Too much might make one 6. (5)
6 Not so fresh as a hack might be. (5)
7 Puts to so much trouble for the frontier settlements. (8)
8 Might cut as well as 2 down. (5)
9 These might be trying to make a lad sore. (7)
15 A place to lie a bone, not altogether up to being related to the barber. (9)
16 It's not difficult traveling when relaxed. (4-5)
17 With an underground head, not particularly visionary. (7)
18 22 with Latin thus confused is hardly honorable. (8)
20 Except Alph's kind of destination doesn't begin to make it! (6)
21 He often has a following in the theater. (5)
23 The belief in suicide is mounting. (5)
24 A Barmeeide one is an illusion. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 695

ACROSS: 1 MODERATE; 5 BEHALF; 10 LIVED; 11 PUGNACITY; 12 DESPAIR; 13 CRIMSON; 14 TAG END; 15 PINKISH; 18 ITERATE; 21 ARCHER; 26 OBVIATE; 27 EXHIBITED; 28 RIDES; 29 TICKER; 30 SOLDERED. DOWN: 1 MALADY; 2 DEVASTATE; 3 RED TAPE; 4 TAPERED; 6 EVASION; 7 ACIDS; 8 AND 17 FLY IN THE OINTMENT; 9 EGG CUP; 16 ICELANDER; 19 AMIABLE; 20 EVENTS; 21 AND 24 A WORD TO THE WISE; 22 COVERED; 23 VERSED; 25 ETHIC.

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

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For seventeen years, Dr. Coca was Medical Director of Lederle Laboratories. It was during this time that he discovered that each human has his own individual pulse range.

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Dr. Coca was the founder and first editor of the Journal of Immunology, now the foremost publication in its field of medicine.

He was Professor of Pathology and Bacteriology at Cornell University; Clinical Professor of medicine at the Post Graduate Medical School of Columbia University; Medical Director of the Blood Transfusion Association of New York.

Dr. Coca served as the Medical Director in charge of research at Lederle Laboratories for 17 years until his retirement.

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